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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has long stated that treaties adopted under Article II of
the Constitution are not acts of "legislation" but rather "contracts" between
sovereign nations.1 This contract analogy was most recently invoked by both
the majority and the dissent in Olympic Airways v. Husain.2 Increasingly,
however, the Court's treaty jurisprudence has borne the mark of "new
textualism."3 Starting with his concurring opinion in United States v. Stuart,4
Justice Scalia has vigorously argued that separation of powers and rule of law
concerns dictate that the Court restrict its inquiry in treaty interpretation cases
to the four corners of the agreement. Although the Court as a whole has not
accepted all aspects of Scalia's argument-such as his aversion to the use of
materials from Senate ratification debates'- textualism has become influential
in treaty interpretation.
The coexistence of these two themes in treaty jurisprudence- textualist
methodology and the notion that treaties are contracts-is problematic.
Contracts are valid only to the extent that there is mutual assent by the
contracting parties to a shared proposition.6 The text of the contract document
is important in determining the scope of the agreement, but it serves only as
evidence of what the agreement is. In the legislative context, the text of a statute
is the agreement. As a result of this divergence, the interpreter's tasks in the
construction of contracts and statutes are fundamentally different. The
interpreter in a contractual dispute is interested primarily in how the parties
themselves would interpret the terms of the contract. An interpreter of statutes
1. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 199, 235-37 (1796).
2. 540 U.S. 644 (2004).
3. The term "new textualism" was coined by Professor William Eskridge to describe the
interpretive methodology championed by Justice Scalia that focuses on the text of the statute
and disallows references to contextual evidence such as legislative history. William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (199o). Justice Scalia gave a
thorough explanation and defense of textualism in his Tanner Lectures. See ANToNiN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
4. 489 U.S. 353, 373 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
5. See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397-400, 403 (1985); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,
417-18 (1984); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 250, 257
(1984). See generally Detlev F. Vagts, Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research
Hints for the Supreme Court, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1989) (discussing Supreme Court
citations to Senate pre-ratification materials in treaty cases).
6. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1:3 (4th
ed. 199o).
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TREATIES AS CONTRACTS
following a textualist methodology focuses on the meanings that neutral third
parties ascribe to particular terms.
This Note will argue that between these two contending principles of treaty
interpretation, the contract analogy should prevail. The strongest justifications
for textualism in statutory interpretation -adherence to the Article I, Section 7
lawmaking process and greater legislative accountability-do not extend to the
treaty context. Likewise, as a practical matter, it is harder to apply textualism to
treaty interpretation because certain interpretive aids that textualists employ-
linguistic canons and references to how given terms are used in the U.S. Code
at large - are inappropriate guides to resolving ambiguities in treaties. The
contract approach, by contrast, has strong grounding in the text, structure, and
history of the Constitution. Further, contract theory could succeed where
existing treaty doctrine fails, by providing a consistent, well-grounded
framework for courts to use when resolving ambiguities in treaties.
Specifically, the courts should borrow from relational contract theory in
developing new canons of treaty interpretation. Within this framework,
contract formalism - textualism's private law cousin - would continue to play a
role in treaty interpretation, particularly for treaties of limited scope that
resemble one-time, discrete contracts in a commercial setting. However, a more
flexible interpretive approach should apply to treaties that govern repeat
interactions between parties over a long period of time. In the context of these
"relational" treaties, the range of sources available to the interpreter would be
much broader than that endorsed by textualists in the statutory context, and
over time this approach could both reduce the costs of treaty negotiation and
encourage foreign parties to assent to dispute resolution by U.S. courts.
I. STATE OF THE DOCTRINE
With the nation's treaty commitments proliferating7 and foreign affairs
cases constituting a growing share of the Supreme Court's docket, 8 it is
7. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390,
396 (1998) ("[T]here has been a proliferation of treaties [in the latter half of the twentieth
century], such that treaty-making has now eclipsed custom as the primary mode of
international lawmaking."); Daniel W. Drezner, On the Balance Between International Law
and Democratic Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 321, 322 (2001) (stating that "the number of
treaties deposited in the United Nations" has "more than doubled" during the past twenty
years); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1304 (2ooo)
("[I]nternational treaty practice has greatly expanded in the past half century and promises
to expand further in the decades ahead as globalization proceeds.").
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surprising how undertheorized the field of treaty interpretation remains. The
Court has developed well-worn interpretive canons in statutory cases that
implicate the international obligations of the United States,9 but the rules for
interpreting the treaties that give rise to those obligations remain few and
underdeveloped. Similarly, most scholarship on treaty interpretation is focused
on the separation of powers,' ° the subject-matter limitations on the scope of
the treaty power," or the distinctions between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties.12 Despite the renaissance in statutory interpretation
scholarship over the past decade, there has been relatively little discussion
either in court opinions or in the scholarly literature of the proper tools and
methods that judges should use to interpret the text of a treaty.
8. In the 2003 and 2004 Terms, at least eleven cases involving foreign affairs or treaty
interpretation issues reached the Court. Two were treaty interpretation cases: Medellin v.
Drake, 544 U.S. 66o (2005) (per curiam), and Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644
(2004). Three were cases arising from the war on terror: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004), Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), and Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
One, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), involved the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Two were foreign sovereign immunity cases: Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), and Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003). One case
involved the extraterritorial reach of antitrust laws: F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). One was an international tax case: Pasquantino v. United States, s44
U.S. 349 (2005). Finally, one case involved the transnational reach of a federal statute on
discovery: Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). See generally
Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture, The 2oo4 Term: The Supreme
Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (2004) (noting the increasing
share of international law cases on the Supreme Court's docket).
9. See, e.g., Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(holding that statutes should be construed, whenever possible, to be consistent with
customary international law); see also Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 164 (arguing that the
rule of comity ordinarily requires courts to "construe[] ambiguous statutes to avoid
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations").
io. Compare JOHN NORTON MOORE, TREATY INTERPRETATION, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
RULE OF LAW (2001) (arguing for deference to executive interpretations of treaties), with
Vagts, supra note s (arguing for a Senate role in treaty interpretation).
ii. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 7 (examining federalism limitations on the treaty power);
Golove, supra note 7 (same).
12. Compare LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 190, 201
(2d ed. 1996) (arguing for a strong presumption that treaties are self-executing), with John
C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original
Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism and the
Constitution] (arguing for a presumption against self-execution), and John C. Yoo, Treaties
and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLuM. L.
REv. 2218 (1999) (same).
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TREATIES AS CONTRACTS
A. Treaty Interpretation in the Supreme Court
A trio of cases, United States v. Stuart,3 Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.,' 4 and
Olympic Airways v. Husain,'" illustrates the Court's recent approach to treaty
interpretation. Two dominant themes run through these cases: recognition
that a treaty interpreter should start with the text of the agreement, and
acknowledgment that treaty interpretation is different from statutory
interpretation because treaties are contracts, not acts of legislation."
Stuart involved a bilateral tax treaty between the United States and Canada
that required tax authorities in both countries to share information necessary to
determine taxpayer liability. The taxpayer in Stuart argued that U.S. law
prohibited the IRS from issuing an administrative summons to collect
information about a taxpayer's liability if the matter had been referred to the
Justice Department for possible criminal charges. 7 The treaty with Canada did
not contain an express prohibition on information-sharing in the context of a
criminal investigation, but it did stipulate that the respective tax collection
agencies were obliged to provide only as much information as each agency
could "obtain under its revenue laws. ' '18 The question presented to the Court
was whether tax authorities in the United States needed assurance from
Canadian authorities that they would not seek criminal charges against the
taxpayer before complying with information requests. The majority disagreed
with the taxpayer's interpretation of the relevant U.S. "revenue law," but
suggested that the purposes of the treaty supported a holding that compliance
with the information request was required. 9 The majority drew support from
the Senate pre-ratification debate, the negotiating materials, and the past
practice of the treaty signatories."0 Likewise, the Court reaffirmed dicta from
an earlier treaty case, Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech," stating that a
13. 489 U.S. 353 (1989)-
14. 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
15. 540 U.S. 644 (2004).
16. For more complete overviews of treaty interpretation in the Rehnquist Court, see David J.
Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953, 979 (1994); and
Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 724 (1998).
17. 489 U.S. at 357; see 26 U.S.C. § 7 6o2(d) (2000).
18. Convention Between the United States of America and Canada Respecting Double
Taxation, U.S.-Can., art. XIX, Mar. 4, 1942, 56 Stat. 1399, 1405.
ig. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 365-68.
20. Id. at 366-70.
21. 311 U.S. 150 (1940).
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treaty should generally be "construe[d] ... liberally to give effect to the
purpose which animates it.
'22
Concurring in the judgment in Stuart, Justice Scalia argued that it was
inappropriate for the Court to resort to extratextual aids because the meaning
of the relevant terms in both the statute and the treaty were sufficiently clear. 23
As a normative matter, Scalia argued that sticking to the text would ensure
greater predictability in treaty interpretation than recourse to context and
negotiating materials:
[N]o one can be opposed to giving effect to "the intent of the Treaty
parties." The critical question, however, is whether that is more reliably
and predictably achieved by a rule of construction which credits, when
it is clear, the contracting sovereigns' carefully framed and solemnly
ratified expression of those intentions and expectations, or rather one
which sets judges in various jurisdictions at large to ignore that clear
expression and discern a "genuine" contrary intent elsewhere. To ask
that question is to answer it. 4
Scalia went on to criticize dicta in other treaty cases suggesting that
extratextual material could be used to override the text of a treaty. Justice
Scalia's concurrence in Stuart coincided with the Court's increased focus on the
plain meaning of the text in statutory interpretation26 and has been recognized
as his attempt to import the same interpretive method to the construction of
treaties. As one commentator put it, Justice Scalia's concurrence is "as clarion
an expression of the textualist canon of treaty interpretation [as] one is likely to
find in a Supreme Court opinion." 7
22. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 368 (quoting Bacardi, 311 U.S. at 163).
23. Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
24. Id.
2s. "[T]he implication is that, had the extrinsic evidence contradicted the plain language of the
Treaty it would govern. That is indeed what we mistakenly said in the earlier case that the
Court cites as authority for its approach." Id. (discussing Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982)).
26. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 227 (1994) (noting that
after 1986, the Court "has been somewhat more willing to find a statutory plain meaning
and less willing to consult legislative history").
27. Bederman, supra note 16, at 979. Stuart was Justice Scalia's first application of these
principles to the field of treaty interpretation, and it represents a shift from an earlier
opinion he authored in O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986). The O'Connor opinion
affirmed a decision of the Federal Circuit that had itself overturned an earlier opinion by a
leading textualist, Judge Kozinski, then the Chief Judge of the Court of Federal Claims.
Judge Kozinski's opinion, which reads like a precursor to Justice Scalia's Stuart concurrence,
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On the textualist view, judges should not divine the intent of particular
legislators but should focus instead on the commonly understood definitions of
the words in the statute.28 By relying on neutral, third-party understandings
rather than the subjective interpretations of the legislators who drafted the
statute, judges will be less inclined to find ambiguity as a vehicle for importing
their own policy views into the law. The resulting interpretive methodology is
said to be more predictable29 and more consistent with both the rule of law3"
and the role of an Article III judge.3'
As applied to treaties, the textualist approach soon garnered a majority of
the Court in Chan.3" Chan addressed whether an airline carrier loses the benefit
of liability limitation under the Warsaw Convention for failure to provide
notice of such limitations on passenger tickets in the io-point font required by
amendments to the treaty.33 Neither the original treaty nor any of the
amending agreements specified the sanctions that would result from an
airline's failure to comply with the notification procedures in these situations.
However, the petitioners argued that the text of the amendments and the
overall purpose of the convention implied that sanctions were appropriate.34
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected these appeals to the treaty's
purpose. Instead, he noted that other provisions of the treaty dealing with
baggage and cargo imposed sanctions for defective notice. Thus, the failure to
explicitly impose sanctions for defective notice in ticketing would seem, based
on the text, to have been a deliberate choice made by the drafters.3" And, in
rejected reliance on the negotiating history in favor of a rigorous analysis of the treaty's text.
Coplin v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 115 (1984), rev'd 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985), affd sub
nom. O'Connor, 479 U.S. 27.
28. Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. that
[t]he meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the
basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger
handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is
... most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have
been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute
(not to mention the citizens subject to it).
490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
29. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1182-84 (1989).
30. See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 17.
31. See id. at 18.
32. 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989).
33. For the relevant regulation, see Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague
Protocol, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (May 19, 1966).
34. See Chan, 490 U.S. at 125-27.
35. See id. at 130-33.
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these situations, Scalia argued, the Court "must thus be governed by the text-
solemnly adopted by the governments of many separate nations -whatever
conclusions might be drawn from the intricate drafting.", 6 This rationale
echoes Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation.
37
The textualist character of Chan gave way to a more eclectic approach in
Olympic Airways.38 There the majority, per Justice Thomas, reiterated based on
prior precedent that while the text of a treaty is certainly relevant, treaties are
not acts of legislation but contracts between sovereign nations. Accordingly,
the Court recognized a "responsibility to read [a] treaty in a manner 'consistent
with the shared expectations of the contracting parties."'39 Olympic Airways
concerned a provision in the Warsaw Convention authorizing liability for
passenger injuries resulting from accidents on commercial airliners. The
petitioner's husband, an asthmatic passenger, had died after a flight attendant
refused his request to be seated further away from the plane's designated
smoking section.4' The Justices disagreed on whether inaction by the attendant
could constitute an "unexpected or unusual event" giving rise to an accident.4
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, considered not only the Convention's
text and dictionary definitions of "event, ''42 but also the views of "sister
signatories" such as England and Australia.43 Even Justice Scalia, in dissent,
nodded to the contractual nature of treaties by relying heavily on judicial
opinions from foreign signatories to support his argument.44
36. Id. at 134.
37. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) ("We do
not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it
nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown
elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.").
38. 540 U.S. 644 (2004).
39. Id. at 650 (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)).
40. Id. at 647-48.
41. Compare id. at 654-55, with id. at 659 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note that neither party
contested the definition of "accident" under the Warsaw Convention as established by Saks.
Id. at 65o, 65i & n.6 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 655.
43. Id. at 656-57.
44. Scalia acknowledged that "[fjoreign constructions are evidence of the original shared
understanding of the contracting parties," id. at 66o (Scalia, J., dissenting), and referenced
cases decided by British courts, id. at 659 (citing Deep Vein Thrombosis & Air Travel Group
Litig., (2004] Q.B. 234), and Australian courts, id. at 66o (citing Qantas Ltd. v. Povey
(2003) 11 V.R. 642, 17, at 652 (Ormiston, J.A.)).
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B. The Theoretical Problem
The coexistence of textualism and the contract analogy in treaty
jurisprudence is problematic because contract theory assumes precisely what
textualism disclaims: that interpretation should be guided by the "shared
expectations of the contracting parties."4" Under textualism, interpretation is
an inherently objective task: words have meanings, and the understandings of
neutral third parties govern.46 Contract interpretation, by contrast, is at least in
part a subjective task under modern doctrine because the contract itself exists
only to the extent that there is mutual assent among the parties to a shared
proposition.
47
When interpreting contracts, courts uncover the expectations of the parties
by considering not only the written words of the contract but also the outward
acts of the parties that provide evidence of mutual assent to a shared
proposition. 48 The "meeting of the minds" analogy for describing the basis of
contract has survived4 9 - and, more importantly, so has the argument for using
contextual factors to interpret the scope of contracts. This introduces an
inherently subjective element into contract interpretation. Courts must be
careful to give weight only to outward manifestations of intent and not to the
secret intentions of one party."0 However, the task of determining what the
contract is necessarily extends beyond the four corners of the written
agreement.
45. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985).
46. See SCALiA, supra note 3.
47. See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.) (holding that no contract
existed when the plaintiff believed that goods would be delivered on a ship named
"Peerless" sailing in December and the defendant intended to purchase goods delivered by
another ship also named "Peerless" sailing in October); see also Nat'l Envtl. Serv. Co. v.
Ronan Eng'g Co., 256 F.3d 995, 1002 (ioth Cir. 2001) ("[C]onsent to form the contract was
not mutual unless the parties all agree[d] upon the same thing in the same sense." (second
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). But see Ronan, 256
F. 3 d at 1002-03 (recognizing that Oklahoma's adoption of the U.C.C. has led to a shift away
from the subjective test of intent, placing "increased emphasis on objective, observable
manifestations of intent to contract").
48. See 1WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 6, § 1:3.
49- See, e.g., Ekedahl v. COREStaff, Inc., 183 F. 3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Proof ofa meeting
of the minds may be found either in the written agreement or, if the agreement is
ambiguous, in the parties' actions at the time of contract formation."); Firth Constr. Co. v.
United States, 36 Fed. CI. 268, 276 (1996) ("Contracting is a sentient process. There must
be objective proof of a meeting of the minds.").
5o. Seel WILLISTON & LoRD, supra note 6, § 1:3.
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Thus, the Court's eclectic approach to treaty interpretation would seem
inherently contradictory. The remainder of this Note will explore the
justifications for both theories in an attempt to create a more consistent
theoretical framework for treaty interpretation.
II. THE CASE FOR TEXTUALISM APPLIED TO TREATIES
Textualists have made strong arguments for restricting judges' interpretive
inquiries to the text of a statute. However, the strongest arguments for
textualism in statutory interpretation arise out of an understanding of Article I,
Section 7 of the Constitution, which deals with legislation, not treaties. This
Part argues that the textualist approach to treaty interpretation lacks both the
theoretical and normative underpinnings of textualism in the context of
domestic legislation.
A. Originalism and Treaty Interpretation
The Constitution is silent as to the methods judges should use to interpret
a legal text. The originalist argument for textualism is based largely on
statutory interpretation cases in England and the colonies prior to the
Founding and therefore has little direct application to treaty interpretation. s'
The surviving historical sources that discuss treaties emphasize their
contractual - as opposed to legislative - character. And to the extent that the
Framers conceived of treaties as contracts, it is reasonable to conclude that they
intended courts to interpret treaties using methods derived from the law of
contracts. That was the nineteenth-century view of Chancellor Kent:
Treaties of every kind, when made by the competent authority, are as
obligatory upon nations, as private contracts are binding upon
individuals; and they are to receive a fair and liberal interpretation, and
to be kept with the most scrupulous good faith. Their meaning is to be
ascertained by the same rules of construction and course of reasoning which
we apply to the interpretation ofprivate contracts.2
si. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 1Ol COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2001).
But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power"
in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-18o6, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990 (2OOl).
52. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTAIES ON AMERICAN LAw 163 (photo. reprint 1971) (N.Y., 0.
Halsted 1826) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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Although courts have not rigorously applied the tools of contract interpretation
to the law of treaties, Kent's view has been cited with approval in multiple
treaty cases.5 3
The realities of international politics and the limitations of eighteenth-
century travel and communications required a treatymaking process that was
more streamlined than the Article I, Section 7 legislative process. Then and
now, successful treaty negotiations require real-time give and take by the
parties at the negotiating table. If American negotiators had to seek approval
from both Houses of Congress before agreeing to given terms in a treaty, the
nation's ability to conduct foreign affairs would be seriously impaired. This
was particularly true in the eighteenth century, when it might have taken
weeks for negotiators to relay messages to and from to their capitals. Moreover,
at the time, Congress met infrequently. Chances are that important
communications from ambassadors to the legislative branch would have lain
unanswered for several months, further undermining the nation's diplomatic
efforts.
Thus, it made sense for the Framers to vest a significant degree of authority
in the executive branch. As James Wilson explained:
Some gentlemen are of opinion that the power of making treaties
should have been placed in the legislature at large; there are, however,
reasons that operate with great force on the other side .... [I]n their
nature treaties originate differently from laws. They are made by equal
parties, and each side has half of the bargain to make; they will be made
between us and powers at the distance of three thousand miles. A long
series of negotiation will frequently precede them; and can it be the
opinion of these gentlemen that the legislature should be in session
during this whole time? 4
Wilson and his colleagues recognized that Article I, Section 7's division of labor
between the executive and legislative branches, which the Founders believed
carried great virtues in the statutory context, would severely constrain the new
nation as an actor on the international stage if applied to treaties. Therefore, a
parallel lawmaking track was in order. Whereas the House, Senate, and
President would all negotiate in the statutory context, the executive would
S3. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437
(1902); Coplin v. United States, 6 CI. Ct. 115, 126 n.11 (1984).
54. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 506 (photo. reprint 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., N.Y., Burt Franklin 2d ed.
1868) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
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represent the interests of the United States in treaty negotiations with foreign
powers. This arrangement was both pragmatic and consistent with the notion
that treaties are contracts negotiated by equal parties."5
Materials from the ratification debates suggest that the practical differences
between treaty and lawmaking reflected broader theoretical differences
between treaties and statutes. As Wilson wrote, "[T]hough the treaties are to
have the force of laws, they are in some important respects very different from
other acts of legislation .... Treaties, sir, are truly contracts, or compacts,
between the different states, nations, or princes, who find it convenient or
necessary to enter into them." 6 Likewise, in The Federalist No. 64, John Jay
wrote that "a treaty is only another name for a bargain," and that "treaties are
made, not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both.
's7
Early Supreme Court practice confirms this understanding as well. The
Marshall Court's treaty cases are replete with references to treaties as contracts.
In Foster v. Neilson, for example, the Court noted that "[a] treaty is in its nature
a contract between two nations, not a legislative act." s8 Three years later, in
Worcester v. Georgia, the Court asked, "What is a treaty? The answer is, it is a
compact formed between two nations or communities, having the right of self
government." 9
The Constitution itself further illustrates the differences between treaties
and statutes and gives clues as to the importance of text in treaty construction.
One difference is obvious: the process for enacting statutes is outlined in
Article I, whereas the treaty power is outlined in Article II.60 A second is more
ss. See THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("[T]he ministerial servant of the Senate could not be expected to enjoy the confidence and
respect of foreign powers in the same degree with the constitutional representative of the
nation, and, of course, would not be able to act with an equal degree of weight or efficacy.").
56. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 54, at 506.
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay), supra note 55, at 394; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 75
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 55, at 418 (explaining that the object of the treaty power is
"contracts with foreign nations, which have the force of law but derive it from the
obligations of good faith" (emphasis omitted)).
58. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
59. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 581 (1832).
6o. Professor John Yoo has suggested that this structural division is key to understanding the
differences between treaties and statutes. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 12,
at 1966 ("[A] significant textual difference between a treaty and a law is found in the treaty
power's placement in Article II, which vests the executive power in the President, rather
than in Article I, which vests 'all legislative Powers herein granted' to the Congress. The
Treaty Clause's location suggests that treaties are executive, rather than legislative, in
nature. The Senate's participation alone does not convert treaties into legislation ... .
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subtle but potentially instructive. Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 reads: "Every
Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States
.... ,6 By contrast, the Treaty Clause provides that the President "shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."62
Thus, the domestic legislative process differs from treaty ratification in two
related respects: first, the legislature plays a more preeminent role in the
passage of domestic legislation (i.e., "passing" as opposed to "concurring"),
and second, the legislature engages more directly with the text in the legislative
process (i.e., concurrence with "treaties" as opposed to passage of "bills"). In
the Article I, Section 7 context, the legislature controls what terms are inserted
into a bill. In the treaty context, the Senate merely assents to the agreement
between the President and a foreign sovereign. The treaty does not gain the
force of law in the United States until ratified by the Senate, but the treaty
itself exists independent of Senate action. 6' Granted, the Senate can give its
assent only insofar as the scope of the agreement is revealed to it. But as long as
the negotiating materials are available to the Senate and the President has
communicated the broader purpose of the treaty, it is reasonable to assume
that the Senate can assent to an agreement that extends beyond the four
corners of the treaty document.
6 4
Precedent reinforces the notion that the Constitution requires a lower
degree of legislative engagement with text in the treatymaking context than in
domestic lawmaking. If the Senate objects to a particular provision, it cannot
amend the language by its own accord. The Court has long held that the
Senate's power in these situations is restricted to ratifying a preexisting
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
62. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
63. Moreover, a state that signs a treaty subject to ratification assumes certain obligations under
international law, if not domestic law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (establishing an
obligation that signatory states that have not yet ratified a treaty refrain from actions that
would "defeat the object and purpose of [the] treaty"); see also Edward T. Swaine,
Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2o61, 2o66-71 (2003) (discussing the obligations of states that
have signed, but not ratified, a treaty).
64. Cf. The ABM Treaty and the Constitution: Joint Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations and the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, iooth Cong. 83-85 (1987) (statement of Laurence
H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School) (arguing that secret treaty terms of which the
Senate is not aware cannot have the force of law because the Senate cannot concur in such
agreements).
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agreement 65 or refusing to ratify altogether. Although the Senate can suggest
reservations, declarations, and understandings to the treaty text, only the
executive and the other parties to the treaty can provide the assent necessary for
a new provision to become part of the treaty. Thus, it would be fair to conclude
that the actual terms in the document are important in determining the precise
scope of the agreement, but, in contrast to the text of a bill, the text of a treaty
is merely evidence of the agreement -not the agreement itself. As a contract,
the treaty comes into being when there is an offer and acceptance, culminating
in mutual assent to a shared proposition.
B. Public Choice Theory and the Structural Case for Textualism in Statutory
Interpretation
The most compelling justification for a textualist approach to statutory
interpretation derives from the structure of lawmaking under the Constitution
as understood through the insights of public choice theory. The bicameralism
and presentment provisions of Article I, Section 7 allow for carefully balanced
deals among competing interest groups. 66 Equal representation of states in the
Senate enables minority coalitions to block legislation favored by the majority.
In addition, the Constitution's deference to both Houses of Congress to devise
their own procedures for passing legislation is a tacit endorsement of
additional vetogates via the committee system or the Senate's cloture rules. 7
The deals struck during each stage of the process are enshrined in the text of
those bills that survive and ultimately land on the President's desk.
Article I, Section 7 does not require the relevant parties to assent to a shared
proposition before a bill becomes a law. The parties need only assent to the
same text. As such, the resulting text often reflects myriad compromises. As the
Court has noted, in a lawmaking system that requires backroom tradeoffs and
side deals in order to secure the passage of legislation,
65. See The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1821) (stating that a treaty cannot be
modified except through the exact same process by which it was initially ratified).
66. See Manning, supra note 51, at 18 ("[S]tatutes result from bargains struck among interest
groups competing for advantage in the legislative process."). See generally Jonathan R.
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 233-40 (1986) (arguing that textualism creates the best
incentives for a well-functioning legislative process).
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. "Vetogates" refer to a series of points in the legislative process
through which prospective legislation must pass. See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive Canons: The
Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 8o GEO. L.J. 705 (1992).
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no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what
competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a
particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice-and it
frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to
assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be
the law.6 8
Thus, in the statutory context, textualists argue that departing from the text
seriously disrupts the Article I, Section 7 process. Judges who look for an
overriding, coherent purpose in any piece of legislation risk upsetting the
original deal struck by the relevant parties, thereby giving one side more than it
bargained for. In this sense, the search for legislative purpose increases the risk
of erroneous interpretation. This risk, in turn, increases the "costs of the
legislative deals," as parties to the legislative process are plagued by doubts
about how courts will interpret legislative deals ex post.
6 9
Similarly, textualists argue that a dynamic approach to statutory
interpretation disrupts the inherent status quo bias of the legislative process.
7
The nightmare scenario would be that a court-acting on extratextual sources
that did not go through the process of bicameralism and presentment -might
give an interpretation to the text that a legislative minority supported but did
not have the strength to enact.
The paradigmatic case that arguably involved such a scenario is United
Steelworkers v. Weber. In Weber, the Court interpreted sections of Title VII
prohibiting employer actions that "discriminate ... because of . . race '71 to
allow race-based affirmative action programs, relying on the overall
ameliorative purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.72 At this point, the
legislative majority-which initially opposed affirmative action and perhaps
thought that its position had been vindicated in the final version of the bill 73 -
68. Rodriguez v. United States, 48o U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per curiam); see also Hrubec v.
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 1269, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Many laws are
compromises, going thus far and no further in pursuit of a goal.").
69. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 895 (1975).
70. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 170-72 (1993) (describing the status quo
bias of the legislative process in the equal protection context).
71. 42 U.S.C. S 20ooe-2(a)(1) (2000).
72. 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
73. Id. at 230 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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was in a worse position to oppose affirmative action than it had been prior to
the bill's passage. 4 As Professor William Eskridge explains:
[T]here has been no serious effort to overrule the Weber decision
legislatively. Any proposal to do so would be highly conflictual, with
intensely interested groups on either side of the issue, giving members
of Congress substantial incentives to avoid taking stands on minority
rights issues. Even if a bill to overrule Weber had majority support in
Congress, it would probably face insurmountable procedural
obstacles.
75
In other words, by shifting the burden of changing the status quo, purpose-
based interpretation may have enabled the supporters of affirmative action to
win in the courts what they could not achieve through the legislative process.
Moreover, should a majority attempt to correct a judicial decision through
legislation, the original error could be reinforced if the minority coalition were
able to protect its court-granted spoils using control over vetogates. In
subsequent cases, judges might then conclude that the legislature's failure to
enact legislation overturning the court's interpretation is itself evidence of
71
acquiescence. r
Driven by this view of the legislative process, textualists argue that it is best
to assume that "legislators and judges are part of a common social and
linguistic community, with shared conventions for communication.
'' 7
Therefore, when interpreting the words of a statute, judges should look neither
to the particular meanings ascribed by participants in the legislative process nor
to the overall purpose of the statute, but instead to "social and linguistic
conventions shared by the relevant community. ''78 By limiting the number of
74. Proponents of a more activist approach to statutory interpretation use the "burden of
inertia" argument in a different way. These scholars argue that vetogates in the legislative
process create an inherent status quo bias that allows entrenched minorities to prevent the
updating of statutes. Therefore, judges should feel more comfortable overturning old
statutes that reflect the status quo bias of the legislative playing field. See generally GUIDO
CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR, THE AGE OF STATUTES 92-101 (1982); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 500-
04 (2001).
75- William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1525
(1987) (footnote omitted).
76. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67, 125-38
(1988).
7. Manning, supra note 51, at 16.
78. Id.
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inputs into the interpretive process, proponents of textualism hope to reduce
the risk of judicial error.
Textualism also aims to enhance electoral accountability.79 As textualists
argue, purpose-based interpretation allows legislators "to pass off difficult
choices of policy to others and that such behavior sabotages the project of
electoral accountability. ,8' To use the Weber example again, it is possible that
legislators who drafted the broad language of Title VII did so hoping that
courts would rely on the ameliorative purpose of Title VII rather than the plain
meaning of "discriminate" to hold that affirmative action programs are allowed
under the statute. At the same time, the arguable ambiguity of the text would
provide the same legislators with political cover from constituents who
opposed affirmative action. In this situation, it would be difficult for voters
who opposed affirmative action to hold their representatives accountable.
Textualism seeks to prevent this kind of strategic obfuscation by limiting
judicial inquiries to the face of the statute. Not consulting legislative history or
the overall purpose of the statute means that judges are not in the business of
cleaning up after legislators; the legislators themselves take on that burden and
any electoral consequences that result. In this sense, textualism acts as a type of
"penalty default rule" that systematically penalizes Congress when it tries to
punt difficult policy choices to the judiciary.8'
C. The Structural Argument Applied to Treaty Interpretation
While the factors discussed above make a compelling case for textualism in
the interpretation of statutes, this argument does not extend to the
interpretation of treaties. The absence of bicameralism and presentment
requirements for treaties makes the judicial search for "intent" in treaty
interpretation less problematic. As a theoretical matter, the judge's task in
interpreting a treaty is simplified by the basic assumption of contract law that
for every agreement there is a single interpretation of the agreement to which
all parties to the contract have consented. In the absence of overlapping
consent, there is no contract. 82 In contrast, Article I, Section 7 requires no
7g. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, io8 HV. L. REv. 593, 641-42 (1995) (noting that Justice Scalia "us[es]
interpretive strategies to modify congressional behavior").
so. Id. at 642.
81. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gerner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (introducing the concept of penalty defaults).
82. Granted, the notion of overlapping consent or a "meeting of the minds" may be as much a
legal fiction in the treaty context as in the legislative context. However, the "meeting of the
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"meeting of the minds," only the passage of identical text. There may be as
many as 536 different interpretations of a particular bill that do not overlap
(one for each member of Congress and the President).
Yet the strongest argument in favor of a distinct interpretive regime for
treaties is that the procedural differences between treatymaking and lawmaking
lower the risk of judicial error in the treaty context. As noted above, in the
statutory context, the Article I, Section 7 process allows a minority of
legislators to use its control over vetogates to block corrective legislation
following a judicial interpretation contrary to the expectations of the enacting
legislative majority. The risks are lower in the treaty context because parties
have the right to cancel the treaty through withdrawal. Even though the ability
of the executive to withdraw from treaties is the subject of some debate in the
academic literature,"' the United States has withdrawn from treaties
unilaterally in the past,84 and the ability of parties to negotiate exit clauses is
beyond doubt.8' The possibility of exit gives the dissatisfied party the option to
minds" analogy is still very much a part of modem contract doctrine. See, e.g., sources cited
supra note 49. As a practical matter, the idea of mutual assent to the same proposition is
more appropriate for a process characterized by offer and acceptance than for a process of
bicameralism and presentment. As a theoretical matter, this fiction is at the heart of contract
theory and is a central factor in contract interpretation. Moreover, to the extent that the
Framers intended judges to view treaties as contracts, it is a fiction the Constitution
implicitly endorses.
83. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 356-59 (2003). Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), presented the Supreme
Court with the question of whether the President can unilaterally terminate a treaty. That
case involved President Carter's efforts to terminate the United States' mutual defense pact
with Taiwan. Members of Congress filed a complaint in federal court to enjoin termination
of the treaty. The district court held that withdrawal required either Senate consent or the
approval of both Houses of Congress. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 964-65
(D.D.C. 1979). The Supreme Court vacated the order but failed to issue a majority opinion
resolving the scope of the President's power to unilaterally terminate treaty obligations.
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996-97.
84. In recent years, the United States has withdrawn from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases,
WASH. POST, Mar. 1O, 2005, at Al.
85. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REv. 1579, 1582 (2005) ("Treaty clauses
that authorize exit are pervasive."). The United States recently withdrew from the ABM
Treaty, which contained.such a clause. See Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Sec'y of State for
Verification, Compliance, & Implementation, State Department's Role in Missile Defense,
Remarks at the National Defense University Foundation Congressional Breakfast Seminar
Series (Apr. 4, 20o6), http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rni/64126.htm ("As permitted by the
ABM Treaty, the U.S. gave notice in December 2001 of its intention to legally withdraw
from that Treaty in order to begin developing and deploying capabilities to protect the
population and territory of our fifty states.").
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cancel the existing agreement and renegotiate, or to use the threat of
withdrawal as leverage to encourage the other parties to amend the treaty.8 6
Similar options could be exercised whenever a domestic court seriously
misinterprets terms of the agreement. In reality, the dissatisfied party might
tolerate an error in construction if the costs of withdrawal and renegotiation
are prohibitive. Nevertheless, that party's ability to correct an erroneous
interpretation remains relatively stronger than that of a similarly situated
legislative majority in the statutory context. Vetogates may prevent the
majority from successfully passing legislation to overturn the court's decision.
And even if the majority in one chamber succeeds in doing so, the Supreme
Court's decision in INS v. Chadha8 7 precludes one-House withdrawal from
statutes.
The possibility of withdrawal also helps obviate the electoral accountability
problem that purpose-based interpretation allows in the legislative context. If
voters are unhappy with a particular judicial construction of a treaty, they can
demand that the President withdraw from the agreement. Because the powers
of the office arguably allow the President to take this action," and because
many treaties provide in their text a means for termination, the President will
be more accountable for his refusal to withdraw from a treaty after a court
gives it an unintended construction.
There is also less cause to believe that textualism can operate as an effective
default rule in the treaty context. The unstated assumption behind this idea is
that the legislature has perfect information about the decisions courts make
and that, over time, textualist judges will force Congress to legislate with
greater precision. s 9 In the legislative context, these assumptions would seem
reasonable. Congress is a fixed assembly that meets regularly and can correct
any interpretations with which it disagrees. In addition, it is divided into
86. The United States has used this strategy in a number of contexts. For example, the United
States withdrew to force amendments to the agreement establishing the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the mid-198os. See
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 962,
977 (2003) (discussing the United States' return to UNESCO).
87. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
88. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 191 (2005) ("In the event of a treaty partner's breach or
collapse, or an executive-branch renegotiation with the partner, a president might act to
abrogate or suspend a federal treaty in a way that he could not ordinarily overturn a federal
statute.").
89. See Schacter, supra note 79, at 643-45; see also id. at 643 n.273 ("Scalia's formalist rigor can be
understood as a belief that such textualism will force the legislature to be more attentive to
its draftsmanship.").
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specialized committees that can monitor court decisions on particular topics.
However, even with regard to statutes, scholars have raised serious doubts
about the assumption of perfect information.9"
The interaction between courts and parties to a treaty is likely even more
limited. For most treaties, there is no fixed assembly to facilitate ongoing
amendments and no equivalent of standing committees to monitor the court
decisions. 91 Consequently, the need for courts to puzzle out the parties'
intentions from contextual evidence may be greater in the treaty context than
in the legislative context. Likewise, given the possibility of withdrawal, the
dangers of judicial intervention are smaller.
D. The Practical Application of Textualism to Treaty Interpretation
Although the emergence of "new textualism" has coincided with the
Court's increased willingness to find that the "plain meaning" of the text
dictates the resolution of statutory interpretation cases, 92 textualism is distinct
from clause-bound "plain meaning" interpretation. 93 Textualists readily
90. The literature on Court-Congress interaction in statutory interpretation is somewhat
conflicted. In an influential article, then-Professor Robert Katzmann found that legislators
were unlikely to correct judicial errors in statutory interpretation because they lacked
awareness of the problem. Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts
and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 8o GEo. L.J. 653 (1992). Professor
Eskridge took a more sanguine view of Court-Congress interaction in an earlier study.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, iol
YALE L.J. 331 (1991). However, Eskridge noted that standing committees were the key
facilitators of this interaction, see id. at 367-72, a factor that is missing in the treaty context.
In a more recent case study of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Professors Victoria Nourse
and Jane Schacter concluded that evidence suggests "a strong awareness of Justice Scalia's
recent critique of legislative history and yet suggest[s] that the critique may have had only a
modest impact, if any, on actual drafting practice in this committee." Victoria F. Nourse &
Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 575, 583 (2002). Textualism-for all its virtues-does not appear to have made
statutory interpretation a predictable enterprise. Cf. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme
Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 115O (2004) (reporting the results of a study in which
legal experts accurately predicted the outcome of Supreme Court decisions in only 59.1% of
cases in the Court's 2002 Term).
91. A treaty regime could set up a monitoring agency to track court decisions. But this would
increase transaction costs that might outweigh the benefits of the penalty default system.
92. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning,
1990 SuP. CT. REV. 231, 246-49.
93. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1532
(1998) (reviewing SCALIA, supra note 3).
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employ certain extratextual interpretive aids such as canons of statutory
construction" 4 and references to the usage of given terms throughout the U.S.
Code.9" The justification behind using these types of interpretive aids is
twofold. First, the courts presume that Congress intends to be consistent in its
usage of words and phrases unless it indicates otherwise. The idea is that
Congress and the courts are part of a common legal and linguistic culture that
defines words in certain ways and respects certain canons of construction.96
The second justification is a variation on the idea of textualism as a penalty
default. Even if the first assumption is something of a legal fiction, courts can
foster more efficient drafting by putting Congress on notice that they intend to
abide by certain rules of construction. The onus is then on the legislature to
draft statutes with greater precision and to provide definitions whenever it
intends to depart from the default regime. Over the long run, if the courts are
consistent in their application of these rules, statutory interpretation should
become more predictable for both legislators and litigants.
Yet linguistic canons and references to the "whole code" are not suitable for
treaty interpretation. In the context of interpreting domestic legislation, it is
reasonable to assume that the courts and Congress share a common legal
culture that recognizes given canons and definitions. However, when the
courts are interpreting a treaty between the United States and a foreign
country, that assumption is justified only to the extent that the two countries'
linguistic and legal traditions are similar. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
rejected "whole code" interpretation in treaty cases on similar grounds. In
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,97 for example, the Court rejected the argument
advanced by the respondents that Warsaw Convention provisions on
compensation for "bodily injury" should be read with reference to U.S. tort
law. The Court noted that at the time of the negotiations, the parties to the
treaty generally did not recognize damages for pain and suffering, as the U.S.
94. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 5ol U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (endorsing the
"established canons of construction" as a guide to interpreting an ambiguous text).
95. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) (Scalia, J.) ("Where a
statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that
permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both
previously and subsequently enacted law.").
96. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) ("Where Congress uses terms that
have accumulated settled meaning under either equity or the common law, a court must
infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the
established meaning of these terms."); Manning, supra note 51, at 16.
97. 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
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courts later came to do. 8 Accordingly, it would be unfair to other signatories
for U.S. courts to interpret terms of the treaty by referencing legal traditions
these countries did not share.
Additionally, the justification for using linguistic canons as default rules is
strongest when there are repeat interactions between those who draft the laws
and those who interpret them. In the case of domestic legislation, the "once
bitten, twice shy" rationale applies. For example, if the default regime fails to
effectuate congressional intent in a given case, Congress is put on notice and
will, presumably, draft future statutes with greater precision. As noted above,
the doubts raised by commentators about the courts' ability to change
congressional behavior via default rules in the legislative setting-where there
is a great deal of repeat interaction between courts and legislative drafters
already built into the system-provide cause for deep skepticism about the
effectiveness of default rules in the treaty context.
III. A CONTRACT REGIME FOR TREATY INTERPRETATION
As often as courts have repeated the axiom that treaties are contracts among
nations, there has been remarkably little exploration of how contract theory
should inform the law of treaties.99 This Part asserts that insights from
relational contract theory could provide judges with a new language and a new
set of tools for interpreting treaties. This methodology would give the courts a
consistent framework for treaty interpretation that is well grounded in the
Framers' expectations and designed to effectuate the intent of the treaty
signatories.
A. Relational Contract Theory
The body of relational contract theory that has developed over the past
twenty years has given judges new tools for interpreting contracts between
parties who interact repeatedly over long periods of time.1°° Compared to
98. Id. at 544 & n.o, 545.
99. One exception to this statement is the canon for construing treaties with Indian tribes,
which holds that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the tribe in recognition of the
unequal bargaining power between native tribes and the federal government. See Montana
v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766-68 (1985).
woo. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SociAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CoNTRACTuAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L.
REv. 854, 886 (1978).
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discrete or "spot" contracts that govern one-time interactions between parties,
relational contracts are "more like marriages than like one-night stands."'. The
project of relational contract theorists has been to construct distinct rules of
interpretation that are best suited to effectuate the intent of the parties in
relational situations. For example, courts are more likely to find implied terms
such as the covenants of good faith and fair dealing in cases addressing
contracts governing long-term, repeat interactions. This process necessarily
requires courts to go "above and beyond [the text] ... [in] interpreting the
four-corners of the agreement," even more than in ordinary contract law. ' °2
Incorporating the relational aspects of contracts into contract interpretation
encourages parties to enter into contracts that would otherwise be inefficient
due to the high risks associated with long-term relationships. In any
contractual setting - relational or otherwise - it is possible for the parties to set
up their own interpretive regime as part of the contract.' °3 However, for long-
term contracts involving contingencies that cannot be foreseen, the cost of
setting up an interpretive regime may be prohibitive. Even when the parties
ultimately decide to enter into a long-term contract, they are likely to leave out
important terms because the negotiating costs are too high. As one leading
contracts scholar notes:
[P]arties write incomplete contracts either because (a) the resource
costs of writing complete contingent contracts to solve contracting
problems would exceed the expected gains or would exceed the costs to
the state of creating useful defaults, or (b) the parties are unable to
identify and foresee uncertain future conditions or are incapable of
characterizing complex adaptations adequately.
1 °4
In these cases, courts can encourage contracting by creating default rules
that simulate the kind of regime that parties to relational contracts would have
created in their own in a world of costless negotiations."' For example, one of
the costs of entering into a long-term contractual relationship is that the parties
1ol. Robert W. Gordon, Macauly, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract
Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 565, 569.
102. Jared Wessel, Note, Relational Contract Theory and Treaty Interpretation: End-Game Treaties v.
Dynamic Obligations, 6o N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 149,157 (1998).
103. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814 (20o6).
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cannot foresee contingencies that might change the value of the contract for
one side or the other. Of course, parties can always renegotiate when the
contingency arises. However, at this point, "the party whom events favor" will
have a stronger bargaining position.1°6 If courts can step in and develop
equitable rules that track the nature of the relationship and recognize the
original purpose of the contract, the risk of one party's being the victim of
unforeseen events is lowered. The key is for the court to take contextual
evidence into account and to evaluate the initial contract in light of the ongoing
relationship. The inquiry will look at the behavior of both parties at the time of
formation and might have little to do with events that occur at the time of the
breach.
As a descriptive matter, relational contract theory has been highly
influential. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that relational factors
can be taken into consideration even when there is no ambiguity in a
contract. 1 7 And the drafters of Article 2 of the U.C.C. embraced gap-filling
when experience and practice give courts the requisite expertise."' As one
scholar has written, "Quite clearly, formalism in contractual interpretation is
not the approach adopted by the U.C.C."' 9
It is worth noting that treaties are not necessarily relational by definition.
Treaties between allies share many characteristics of relational contracts. But
others, such as a treaty ending an armed conflict, might more closely resemble
spot contracts than relational contracts.10 Using the insights of relational
contract theory, courts could apply a different interpretive approach to
different treaties, based on the scope of the relationship at issue. If the treaty is
designed to deal with a one-time issue, courts might follow a formal, textualist
approach when interpreting the treaty. But if the agreement is meant to
establish a long-term relationship, courts would be justified in looking beyond
the four corners of the agreement. The following Subsections explore how this
theory might be applied in practice.
106. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U.
L. REV. 749, 751 (2000).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 202(4) (1979) ("Where an agreement involves
repeated occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the
performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance
accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in the interpretation of the
agreement.").
io8. See U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2O01); see also Scott, supra note 104, at 857 n.29.
log. Scott, supra note 104, at 866.
110. See infra Section III.B.
848




One rule that commentators argue is particularly well suited for the
relational context is the implied covenant of good faith."' This basic tenet of
contract law requires parties to abstain from any act that would prevent or
hinder performance of the contract."12 Courts that apply this doctrine assume
that parties to a contract undertake obligations governing their conduct that
arise from the nature of the contract itself rather than from the text of the
agreement. Although the doctrine of good faith is recognized by most states,"3
it remains controversial,"4 and some courts have sharply limited the doctrine in
recent years. '
Critics of the good faith doctrine in contract law have argued that the
doctrine creates too much uncertainty."6 However, it is not clear that this
argument holds for relational contracts in general or for contracts between
nations in particular. In agreements that bind parties to repeat interactions over
a long period of time, any uncertainty that results from judicial construction of
the good faith requirement may be overshadowed by the uncertain risks of
entering into the relationship in the first place. In theory, parties can contract
around any contingency, but their inability to predict the future puts inherent
limits on their ability to manage risk through bilateral contracting. '17 The
longer and more intense the relationship, the more difficult it is for parties to
mi'. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REv.
483, 522 (identifying scholars who explain the good faith doctrine in relational terms).
112. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 295 (1932). Then-Judge Cardozo laid the foundation for
the modern doctrine of good faith in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, describing his view
that certain promises are "instinct with an obligation" to act in good faith. 118 N.E. 214, 214
(N.Y. 1917) (quoting McCall Co. v. Wright, 115 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (App. Div. 19o9)).
113. See Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework ]br Resolving the
Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 585 & n.l (1996) (noting the "widespread recognition" of the
doctrine of good faith among state courts).
114. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Parry Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1223, i46 (1999) (noting that "[c]onsiderable controversy remains" as to the precise
application and scope of the doctrine).
11S. See, e.g., Barnes v. Burger King Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that the
requirement of good faith cannot override express terms in a contract).
116. For example, in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, Judge Easterbrook
argued that even when "[I]iteral implementation of unadorned language may destroy the
essence of the venture," courts should stick to the plain meaning interpretation because a
contrary reading "would reduce commercial certainty and breed costly litigation." 908 F.2d
1351, 1357 (7 th Cir. 199o).
117. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 103.
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foresee potential problems. The chance that one party will act in bad faith
raises the cost of entering into the contract in the first place, potentially
rendering the cost of negotiations prohibitive. Thus, the doctrine of good faith
can act as insurance against these risks and reduce transaction costs.
Although one Supreme Court opinion from the nineteenth century applied
the good faith doctrine in interpreting treaty obligations," 8 the Court has not
developed this doctrine. It could, however, be a useful tool for interpreting
relational treaties. Unforeseen, bad faith acts are among the risks of entering
into relational treaties -including far-reaching trade agreements such as
NAFTA. After the agreement is sealed, reliance interests start to develop on
both sides, as businesses and governments make investments in accordance
with the treaty framework. This creates the opportunity for one side to exploit
for its own gain the other's reliance on the relationship.
Assume, for example, that the United States and a foreign nation enter into
a free trade agreement that prohibits import tariffs but allows both parties to
conduct customs inspections of imported goods. After the agreement is in place
for several years, the foreign trading partner institutes a policy of invasive
customs searches of American software imports designed to allow the foreign
government to extract proprietary code that it will then share with its own
domestic software manufacturers. Alternatively, imagine that the trading
partner threatens this kind of piracy unless the United States agrees to support
its favored candidate to be the Secretary General of the United Nations. The
possibility that a trading partner will commit unforeseen acts of bad faith
increases the cost of entering into the agreement for all parties concerned.
Granted, the parties might have avoided these contingencies by writing a more
detailed agreement, but that might have rendered the negotiations
prohibitively expensive." 9 Even then, the parties' inability to predict the future
would create uncertainty about the protective value of the more precisely
worded draft. Courts can provide a kind of insurance policy in these situations
by ordering the parties to refrain from acting in bad faith, even when the
agreement does not expressly prohibit such conduct.
118. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (189o) ("It is a general principle of construction with
respect to treaties that they shall be liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent
intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them.").
iig. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 103, at 823.
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Current treaty interpretation doctrine allows for consideration of past
practice. 2 ' Relational contract theory would provide a sound jurisprudential
basis for this approach on three grounds. First, courts would assume that the
parties' conduct after sealing the agreement is evidence of the parties' original
intentions. Second, looking to past practice serves to protect reliance interests
of the parties that develop over the course of the relationship. Finally, allowing
judges to consider evidence of past practice might limit departure from the four
corners of the agreement to those cases in which the depth of the relationship
between the parties justifies such departure. If the parties have a shallow
relationship that involves few interactions, formal textualist analysis of the
contract may be justified from an efficiency standpoint."' In these cases, there
will necessarily be less extrinsic material relating to past practice to which
courts could refer. Therefore, the judge's ability to deviate from the text is
directly proportional to the scope of the relationship between the parties to the
disputed contract.
3. Parol Evidence
Borrowing from contract theory would also help the courts determine
when it is appropriate to look beyond the text of a treaty and what sources are
appropriate to consult. The Supreme Court has recognized that the restrictive
interpretation of the parol evidence rule should not apply in cases involving the
interpretation of state compacts, and it has used extrinsic evidence to
determine the scope of these agreements.'22 If courts applied this approach to
treaty interpretation, the types of extrinsic sources that would be available to
the interpreter would include the travaux priparatoires and, in limited
circumstances, Senate negotiating materials.
It is most appropriate to use treaty negotiating materials to aid in the
interpretation of an agreement when there is evidence that a specific definition
was a critical part of a bargain struck during the negotiations. Once a court has
found that ambiguity exists, it could look at whether the provision was the
io. See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 65o (2004) (noting that the
interpretation of "accident" under the Warsaw Convention relied in part upon the
subsequent conduct of parties to the Convention).
11. See infra Section III.B.
122. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 5o U.S. 221, 235 n.5 (1991) (noting that "it is
appropriate to look to extrinsic evidence of the negotiation history of the Compact" because
"a congressionally approved compact is both a contract and a statute").
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subject of debate among the negotiators. 123 This approach was key in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, Inc.," which addressed whether Article 33 of the
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 125 prevents a
signatory from returning refugees whom it intercepts on the high seas. The
Court held that even though such actions may "violate the spirit of Article 33,"
the negotiating history suggested that a specific understanding had been
reached to narrow the obligations imposed by an earlier draft of the treaty and
that at least one nation's accession to the Convention was contingent on the
narrow understanding that the Court ultimately endorsed. 16
Senate materials also have a role in the interpretive process, but only in
limited circumstances. Following on the preceding point, Senate materials are
clearly relevant when the Senate has forced the parties to renegotiate. 127 Beyond
the specific case of conditional ratification, however, the problem with viewing
Senate materials in isolation is that it does not ensure that both parties to the
treaty are represented. As the Court has noted, "There is something... which
shocks the conscience in the idea that a treaty can be put forth as embodying
the terms of an arrangement with a foreign power..., a material provision of
which is unknown to one of the contracting parties .... ,12' Therefore, when
123. This position is consistent with Professor Hersch Lauterpacht's argument that "in no
circumstances ought preparatory work to be excluded on the ground that the treaty is clear
in itself. Nothing is absolutely clear in itself." H. Lauterpacht, Some Observations on
Preparatory Work in the Interpretation of Treaties, 48 HARv. L. REV. 549, 571 (1935).
124. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
125. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33.1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176
("No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.").
126. Sale, 509 U.S. at 183, 184-87. A recent Second Circuit opinion authored by Judge Katzmann
followed a more purpose-based methodology. In construing the term "habitual residence of
the child" in the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
Oct. 25, 198o, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention], Judge
Katzmann first noted that the Convention did not specify a definition of the term, but he
argued that the panel should apply a definition consistent with the purpose of the treaty: "to
protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or
retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their
habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access." Gitter v. Gitter, 396
F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Hague Convention, supra, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98). In this
context, Judge Katzmann concluded that parental intentions were of overriding significance
in determining the habitual residence of the child. Id. at 131.
127. See United States v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 202 U.S. 563, 565 (19o6) (noting that Congress
passed a resolution stating that the treaty would not take effect until it was approved, as
recently amended by the Senate, by both parties to the treaty).
128. N.Y. Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1, 23 (1898).
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determining whether or not to refer to Senate materials, a court would need to
ask whether the materials were available to all contracting parties during the
ratification debate and whether any parties objected to the interpretations
Senators gave to particular terms during the course of that debate. Committee
reports that were not broadly circulated or statements that were read to an
empty chamber would not suffice, unless there were some indication that the
parties assented to the interpretations given in those documents. Neither
would reservations that the Senate included in its ratification resolution that
were not accepted by all parties to the treaty.'2 9 This selective use of Senate
ratification materials is consistent with contract theory because the purpose is
not to divine the intent of the Senate but to determine the intent of the parties
to the agreement- that is, the treaty parties. 3 '
This approach to parol evidence is also consistent with international norms.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties endorses what some
commentators have referred to as a "quasi-textualist" approach. 3 ' Article 32 of
the Convention cautions interpreters to consult negotiating materials only as a
last resort. When a provision is "ambiguous or obscure" or "[]eads to a result
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable," the Convention allows the
interpreter to look beyond the four corners of the written agreement. '32 And in
these situations, the Convention endorses use of certain contractual concepts -
such as the doctrine of good faith 133 - that necessarily require the interpreter to
look to the purpose of the agreement.
129. Here I am only referring to reservations that are not authorized by the treaty itself. Some
treaties specifically allow for reservations. See Heifer, supra note 85, at 1586. Notably,
however, even in the absence of such provisions, other parties may object to a particular
reservation as contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. See Vienna Convention, supra
note 63, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337 (requiring all reservations to treaties that do not
expressly authorize or preclude reservations to comply with an "object and purpose" of the
treaty test). If both the President and the Senate concur in a reservation specifically
authorized by a treaty, the treaty, minus the reserved portion, is binding law in the United
States. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 314
cmt. b (1987).
13o. MooRE, supra note 1o, at 16-17.
131. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Treaty Interpretation from a Negotiator's Perspective, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 292-94 (1988).
132. Vienna Convention, supra note 63, art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
133. The Convention states that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith." Id. art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339.
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B. Assessing a Contract Regime in Treaty Interpretation
Because courts and commentators have not explored the application of
contract theory to treaty interpretation in great depth, there is very little
literature that poses specific objections to the argument this Note advances.
However, the existing literature on formalism in contract law and the role of
the courts in interpreting treaties provides a guide for anticipating these
objections. Although the courts and the U.C.C. have moved away from
formalism in contract interpretation, this trend has received a hostile reception
in some corners of the legal academy. Regardless, many of the traditional
objections to relational contract theory and to a more flexible understanding of
the parol evidence rule either do not apply in the treaty context or could be
adequately addressed.
One of the key criticisms of inviting judicial flexibility in contract
interpretation is that it increases uncertainty in commercial transactions. 4
Relational contract theory is vulnerable to this attack: as it seeks to decrease the
risks of unforeseeable contingencies in long-term contracts, it introduces
another element of uncertainty, namely whether or not courts will deem the
contract relational. One of the major criticisms of relational contract theory is
that assessing the difference between a spot contract and a relational contract is
more an art than a science.3 ' No contract-or treaty for that matter-is ever
fully relational or fully discrete. As the founder of relational contract theory,
Professor Ian Macneil, whimsically concedes, "[L]ike the ends of rainbows, the
ends of the relational/as-if-discrete spectrum are mythical.113
6
This is especially true in the context of international relations, in which the
distinction between allies and enemies is not always clear. Even a nation like
Cuba, with whom the United States does not have formal diplomatic ties, has a
"relationship" with the United States. The United States maintains a military
installation at Guantinamo Bay, the two nations belong to multinational
organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of American
States, and there are regular contacts between air traffic control and
immigration officials from both countries.
134. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 162 (1994).
135. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L.
R~v. 8o5 (2000).
136. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 877,
896 (2000).
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However, in the treaty context, there are several objective factors courts
could use to develop default presumptions for determining whether a given
treaty is relational or discrete.'37 For example, courts could ask whether the
nation has formal diplomatic relations with the United States, whether it has
signed bilateral trade or extradition agreements, or whether it has been
designated as an aggressor or terrorist sponsor by the State Department.
Courts also could draw distinctions between treaties that are intended to strike
a "truce" and those that are intended to inaugurate a long-term relationship.
This approach has the advantage of putting the decision about whether to
depart from the four corners of the agreement into the hands of the parties
themselves. As the courts develop default rules, the treaty parties will be able to
order their relationships to signal their intentions as to how courts should
interpret agreements between them.
Several commentators -including leading statutory textualists including
Justice Scalia3 8 and Judge Easterbrook 3 9 -have also argued for a revival of
formalism in contract law by voicing doubts about the ability of courts to
fashion efficient rules to deal with gaps and ambiguities in contracts. The
argument for formalism in contract interpretation is ultimately based on
empirical assumptions about the ability of courts to determine efficient
outcomes and the costs for parties to negotiate ex ante. 4 ° Contract formalists
believe it is difficult for judges to devise broadly applicable rules that are
efficient for heterogeneous parties in a complex modern economy. 4 ' But
federal courts have demonstrated some ability to develop such rules in at least
one relational context, labor law, in which, Macneil has argued, the key statutes
are relational in character. 142 Over time, the courts might be able to do the same
in the treaty context.
Applying contract principles to treaty interpretation might also give rise to
separation of powers concerns. The conduct of foreign affairs is within the
137. Macneil answers this criticism of relational contract theory by describing the characteristics
of relational and discrete contracts. Discrete contracts focus more on consent and
implementation, while relational contracts seek to intensify exchange and to create new
norms governing the relationship between parties. Id. at 896-97; see also Wessel, supra note
102.
138. See, e.g., Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
139. See, e.g., Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th
Cir. 1990).
140. Scott, supra note 104, at 875.
141. Id. at 863.
142. See Macneil, supra note 136, at 897.
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province of the "political" branches of government, 43 and a contractarian
regime for interpreting treaties necessarily involves a greater level of judicial
engagement in foreign affairs issues. However, courts' deference to the political
branches in foreign affairs is not absolute, as a plurality of the Court made clear
recently when it rejected the Bush Administration's argument that Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not apply to al Qaeda.' 44 Likewise, to
the extent that courts look to signals from the executive branch in determining
whether it is appropriate to depart from the text of an agreement, the political
branches would retain a degree of choice in how treaties are interpreted.' 4
And, as noted above, the President's ability to withdraw from treaties gives the
executive branch the ultimate power to determine whether a given treaty
construction will have the enduring force of law. Finally, as a matter of
constitutional law, the question of whether judicial actions intrude on the
province of other branches depends in part on whether there is a "lack of
judicially discoverable standards" for resolving the case. , 6 This Note has
argued that modern contract theory provides the necessary standards to guide
judicial interpretation of treaties.
143. See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The conduct of the foreign
relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and
Legislative -'the political'- Departments of the Government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.").
But see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) ("[T]he competence
and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with
other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law.").
144. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796 (2006).
145- Deference to the executive branch's interpretation of treaty provisions is already a well-
established canon of treaty interpretation. See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano,
457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) ("Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty
provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is
entitled to great weight."). It should also be noted that a contract framework for resolving
treaty disputes should have the sole purpose of effectuating the intent of the parties -
without vesting "common lawmaking" powers in the federal courts. Professor Michael Van
Alstine argues that courts should view treaty interpretation cases as an opportunity to revive
the common law tradition. See Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 722. The "dynamic" role that
Van Alsine has suggested that judges play in treaty interpretation raises serious separation
of powers concerns and would ultimately fail to provide a predictable and consistent
framework for resolving treaty disputes. See John C. Yoo, Rejoinder: Treaty Interpretation and
the False Sirens of Delegation, 9o CAL. L. REv. 1305 (2002).
146. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962).
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Proponents of "new textualism" have made a compelling case for why
courts should stick to the written words when interpreting a statute. However,
as strong as that case is, it does not naturally extend outside of the Article I,
Section 7 context. When interpreting contracts between nations, the courts
should not borrow wholesale from the statutory interpretation toolbox.
Instead, they should look to the first principles of contract law to guide their
inquiry. This approach is consistent with how the Constitution describes the
treatymaking process, and it has the potential to bring some coherence to an
area of the law where order is sorely needed.
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